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OF

THE

SUPREME
STATE

COURT

OF

UTAH

RICHARD JENSEN and DON
:HRISTENSEN, djb /a
BERNINA SEWING MACHINE CO.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

No. 10027

HAROLD L. BARRICK and
FRED M. POULSON, d/b/a
MODERN SEWING MACHINE CO.,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appeal from order of perpetual stay of execution on
question of whether debt for misappropriation of trust
funds, conversion of property delivered on consignment,
and conversion of mortgaged property and collection of
assigned fund and appropriation of proceeds is dischargeable in bankruptcy.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Order vacating District Court's order of perpetual stay
of execution, or failing that, remanding the matter for
trial on issue of dischargeability of debts in question.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants delivered merchandise (sewing machines,
etc.) to Respondents under terms of agreement (R. 4-7)
under which Appellants retained title until merchandise
was sold to customers for cash (R. 4, Par. 2; R. 5, Par. 4;
R. 6, Par. 12), whereupon title to proceeds of sale vested
in Appellants (R. 4, Par. 2) to be held in trust for the
benefit of Appellants and to be forthwith remitted to
Appellants (R. 6, Par. 12). At the time of the execution of
said agreement, Respondents acknowledged that they
were holding the sum of $2,831.37 cash in trust for the
benefit of Appellants (R. 4) . Respondents failed to remit
or to account for said trust funds or the proceeds received
from sale of consigned merchandise to Appellants or to
return or to account for unsold merchandise when demand for its return was made upon them (R. 2, Par. 2 &
3), a grand total of $5,617.83 (R. 1, Par. 3; R. 3, Par. 7;
R.16).
Respondents further secured their debt to Appellants
by a written agreement (R. 8-9) wherein they assigned
$2,710.32 of reserve funds held by finance companies
(R. 8, Par. 1-3) to Appellants and expressly agreed that
all amounts received by them from said assigned funds,
or from the sale of merchandise pledged by third parties
in connection therewith, would be held in trust for the
benefit of and forthwith remitted to Appellants (R. 8-9,
Par. 5). Respondents collected said trust funds but failed
to remit any part thereof to Appellants (R. 1, Par. 5; R. 2,
Par. 4).
Respondents also further secured their debt to Appellants by executing a chattel mortgage on two motor veSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hicles subject to existing mortgage thereon in favor of a
third party (R. 8, Par. 4). The Appellants' chattel mortgage was not recorded at the request of Respondents and
because of the prior mortgage thereon. The vehicles were
wrongfully sold by Respondents in utter disregard of the
mortgage in favor of Appellants and the proceeds appropriated by the Respondents (R. 2, Par. 5). Appellants filed
an affidavit for attachment by reason of "misappropriation of trust funds" (R. 10) and a complaint alleging misappropriation and conversion of trust funds, of merchandise delivered on consignment, of proceeds from sale
thereof, of funds received from finance companies which
had been assigned to Appellants, and of vehicles mortgaged to Appellants and of the proceeds received therefrom (R. 1-9), and obtained a judgment by default against
the Respondents (R. 16), after the Respondents had
filed bankruptcy (R. 19).
Respondent Poulson's motion for permanent stay of
execution (R. 17-18) was granted, and the order entered
recited that Appellants' claim was a dischargeable obligation which had been discharged by Respondent's bankruptcy (R. 34). Appellants prosecute this appeal from
that order for the reason that the Respondents' debt to
Appellants is not a dischargeable debt under Section 17
of the bankruptcy law (11 U.S. Code Annotated 35). The
Respondent's discharge in bankruptcy expressly recites
that it does not discharge debts which are excepted from
the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy (R. 19).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANTS' JUDGMENT WAS NOT DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY BECAUSE OF RESPONDENTS' OBTAINING PROPERTY BY FALSE
PRETENSES AND THEIR WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY TO THE APPELLANTS' PROPERTY
RIGHTS.
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act ( 11 U.S. Code Annotated 35) reads in part as follows:
"Sec. 17 Debts Not Affected by a Discharge. a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debts, except such as . . .
(2) are liabilities for obtaining property by false
pretenses or false representations, or for willful and
malicious injuries to the person or property of
another, ... " (emphasis added)
Entry of the default certificate (R. 15) and the judgment by default (R. 16) was an admission by Respondents
of every traversable allegation of Appellants' cause of
action (Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bowman, Judge, 38
Utah 326, 113 P. 63), and is tantamount to an admission
that the Appellants were entitled to a judgment as
prayed. ( 30A Am. J ur 296, Sec. 223 and cases there cited;
98 ALR 1020; 11 LRA NS 803; Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 177
P. 2d 364, 78 C.A. 2d 127). In determining the nature of
the cause of action and whether it is dischargeable, the
Court will look behind a judgment to ascertain from the
record whether the obligation which was merged in the
judgment is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Lyon v. Lyon,
115 U. 466; 206 P. 2d 148; National Finance Company of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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>rovo v. Daley, 14 U. 2d 263, 382 P. 2d 405; Jaco v. Baker,

.48 P.2d 938, 174 Or. 191.
Entry of the default judgment constituted admission by
tespondents that they were guilty of willful and mali:ious injury to the property rights of Appellants within
he meaning of the Bankruptcy Act in many particulars,
ncluding but not limited to the following:
(a) Their conversion of Appellants' trust funds held
>y them in the sum of $2,831.37 (R. 4).
(b) Their conversion of merchandise of Appellants (R.
2; R. 4; R. 1-3).

~'Par.

(c) Their conversion of unsold merchandise of Appel.ants which they failed to return when Appellants denanded the return of said merchandise (R. 2, Par. 7).
(d) Their conversion and/or misappropriation of trust
:unds of Appellants received from sale of Appellants'
nerchandise.
(e) Their conversion andjor misappropriation of trust
:unds of Appellants collected from finance companies (R.
L, Par. 5; R. 2, Par. 4; R. 8 & 9, Par. 1, 2, 3 & 5).
(f) Their conversion of a truck and station wagon
nortgaged to Appellants but sold by Respondents and the
~roceeds misappropriated by Respondents in utter disregard of the unrecorded chattel mortgage of Appellants
(R. 2, Par. 5; R. 3, Par. 5 and 6; R. 8, Par. 4) which was
1ot recorded at the request of Respondents and by reason
)f the existing mortgage on said vehicles in favor of a
1nance company (R. 8, Par. 4).
The debt due to Appellants, which was merged into
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their default judgment, is for willful and malicious injuries to the property rights of Appellants and accordingly said debt was not discharged by Respondents'
bankruptcy, it not being the purpose of the bankruptcy
act to release a bankrupt from a judgment against him as
a result of his fraud or his willful and malicious wrong·.doing. Koch v. Segler (Mo App), 331 SW 2d 126, 78
ALR 2d 1220.

Obtaining property by means of false pretenses
The sale by Respondents of the vehicles upon which
Appellants had a chattel mortgage and their appropriation of the proceeds constitutes obtaining of property
under false pretenses (9-1-13, UCA, 1953) and makes the
liability to Appellants non-dischargeable under the bankruptcy law [Sec. 17 (2) supra]. In a like manner the
Respondents made their obligation to Appellants nondischargeable in bankruptcy by their misconduct described in paragraph (a) through (e) above.

Wilful and Malicious Injuries to the property of another
The acts done by Respondents described in paragraphs
(a) through (f) above all constitute wilful and malicious
injuries to Appellants' property which render their obligation to Appellants non-dischargeable in bankruptcy
(Sec. 17 [2] supra).
Ill will or special malice is not required, it being sufficient that a wrongful act was done intentionally, without
just cause or lawful support. Bank of Williamsville v.
Amherst Motor Sales, 234 App. Div. 261, 254 NYS 825,
20 Am. Bankr. Rep. (NS) 623. The default judgment entered in our case conclusively establishes that the acts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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:omplained of were done intentionally and without just
:ause or lawful support, which is sufficient without more
o prevent the discharge by bankruptcy of the debt owed
,y Respondents to Appellants.
The property injured need not be tangible or physical.
Jrobst v. Jones, 262 Mich 678, 274 NW 779; 63 ALR 2d
i50. The disposal of another's property without his knowl!dge or consent, done intentionally in disregard of what
me knows to be his duty, is a wilful and malicious injury
.o property which will prevent a discharge in bankruptcy.
W:clntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205, 37
). Ct. 38; Mason v. Sault, 93 Vt. 412, 108 A. 267, 18 ALR
l426, 44 Am. Bankr. Rep. 504.
Sale of pledged or mortgaged property by the mortas in our case [see paragraphs (b), (c) and (f)
)age 5] is clearly a wilful and malicious injury to the
)roperty rights of another which prevents discharge of
:he debt by bankruptcy as illustrated by the following
!ases:
~agor

(1) Wrongful sale of land subject to unrecorded deed
as mortgage. Probst v. Jones, 247 NW 779, 262 Mich.
)78.
~iven

(2) Sale of mortgaged mare by mortgagor who appropriated proceeds. Mason v. Sault, 108 A. 267, 93 Vt. 412.
(3) Unlawful conversion of another's shares of stock
md disposal thereof, the owner obtaining a judgment by
iefault. VanEpps v. Aufdemkamp, 138 Cal. App. 622, 32
P. 2d 1116.
( 4) Refusal of consignee of eggs to return or pay for
them. Re Nordlight, 3 F. Supp. 486, 22 Am. Bankr. Rep.
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(NS) 481.
(5) Taking another's cattle and appropriating them tc
own use. Bever v. Swecker, 138 Iowa 721, 116 N.W. 704
(6) Failure to pay over to bank the proceeds receivec
from sale of engine which was mortgaged as security for
loan. Sabinal Nat. Bank v. Bryant, 221 S.W. 940, 45 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 549.
The wrongful appropriation of funds of another as was
doneinourcase [seepar. (a), (d) and (f),page5] is also
a wilful and malicious injury to property which prevents
the discharge of a debt in bankruptcy, as illustrated by
the following cases:
(7) Conversion to own use by merchant of money
collected for creditor on assigned accounts. Baker v. Bryant Fertilizer Co., 271 F. 473, 46 Am. Bankr. Rep. 579.
( 8) Collecting and retaining money from interest in
corporation after assigning said interest in corporation as
security for loan. Re Binsky, 6 F. Supp 789,24 Am. Bankr.
Rep. (NS) 170.
(9) Collection by employee of wages after he had assigned them to creditor. Covington v. Rosenbusch, 148 Ga.
459, 97 SE 78, 42 Am. Bankr. Rep. 400.
(10) Conversion of unsold consigned goods after demand for their return. Mathieu v. Goldbert, 156 F. 541;
42 ALR 2d 906.
(11) Conversion of money. Young v. City Natl. Bani<
(Tex. Civ. App.).
(12) Failure of an agent to pay over money collectec
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1r his principal is a wilful and malicious injury to the

1tter's property. In re Stenger, DC 1922, 283 F. 419.
POINT II
APPELLANTS' JUDGMENT WAS NOT DISHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY BECAUSE DEBT WAS
REATED BY RESPONDENTS' FRAUD, EMBEZZLE[ENT, MISAPPROPRIATION OR DEFALCATION
THILE ACTING IN A FIDUCIARY CAPACITY.
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S. Code Annolted 35) reads in part as follows:
"Sec. 17 Debts Not Affected by a Discharge. a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debts, except such as . . .
( 4) were c1·eated by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriat~on, or defalcation while acting as an officer or in a fiduciary capacity; . .. " (emphasis added)
The entry of the default judgment in this matter is an
dmission by Respondents of every Traversable allegation
E Appellants' cause of action (see discussion supra at
age 6), including but not limited to the failure of
1e Respondents to account to Appellants for their money
nd property held by Respondents in a fiduciary capacity.
Generally brokers, factors and commission merchants
ave not been held to be "fiduciaries" within the meaning
f the foregoing statute excepting certain debts from disharge by bankruptcy ( 42 ALR 2d 896, 9 Am. Jur. 2d
lankruptcy 604), however, there are a substantial numer of decisions to the contrary. 42 ALR 2d 902; 9 Am.
ur. 2d Bankruptcy 604. The decisions seem to turn on the
uestion of the nature of the trust, the "fiduciary" capa-
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city mentioned in the bankruptcy statute relating tc
technical or express trusts and not to those trusts which
the law implies from a contract or from the position oj
parties to a transaction. 16 ALR 2d 1152, 9 Am. Jur.
Bankruptcy 602 and cases there cited. Ordinary commercial transactions where confidence is reposed in a person
does not create a "fiduciary" relationship within the
meaning of that act, however, without question, a trustee
of an express trust is in a "fiduciary capacity" within the
meaning of that statute. Culp v. Robey, 299 SW 846, 156
ALR 217, Bracken v. Milner (CC MU) 104 F. 522.
As to a part of the transactions between Appellants and
Respondents the usual relationship of broker or factor
does exist, however, our situation is different in that the
parties expressly agreed that a trust relationship would
exist.
In addition to the "fiduciary relationship" existing with
respect to goods delivered to Respondents on consignment, the parties expressly agreed that a trust relationship would exist in several instances, each of which trusts
were breached by Respondents misappropriating the trust
assets, including the following:
(a) Respondents acknowledged that they were holding
$2,831.37 of Appellants' funds in trust for Appellants (R.
4, Par. 1), which funds were never remitted to Appellants
(R. 1-3; R. 10).
(b) Respondents agreed to hold all funds received from
finance company reserves in trust for the benefit of Ap·
pellants and to forthwith remit said funds to Appellant~
(R. 1, Par. 5; R. 2, Par. 4; R. 8, 9, Par. 1, 2, 3 and 5). Fund~
were collected from finance company reserves by Re·
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>ondents and misappropriated by Respondents (R. 2,
ar. 5).
(c) Failure of Respondents to return the unsold mer1andise upon demand constitutes a breach of a "fidulary" capacity which bars discharge of the debt in bankJptcy. Mathieu v. Goldberg, CC NY 156 F. 541.
(d) Failure of Respondents to account to Appellants
>r proceeds received from wrongful sale by them of
ehicles mortgaged to Appellants constitutes a breach of
fiduciary relationship" within the meaning of foregoing
~atute excepting such debts for discharge in bankruptcy.
In each of the instances indicated in paragraphs (a)
rrrough (d) above, an express trust existed between the
arties, and in each instance the Respondents violated the
,rovisions of Sec. 17 ( 4) of the bankruptcy act which
~revents discharge of debts ". . . created by fraud, emezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting
.. in any fiduciary capacity; ... " and accordingly Repondent's debt to Appellants was not discharged by his
.ischarge in bankruptcy.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The issue before the Court is clear. Shall a man be
permitted to mis-appropriate funds held in trust by him
merchandise held on consignment, proceeds held in trust
for another received from sale of that person's merchandise, to collect and appropriate to his own use funds
which have been assigned to another, and to sell property
which has been mortgaged to another and appropriate the
proceeds to his own use, and then to discharge the entire
indebtedness in bankruptcy? The legislature has imposed
rather severe penalties and sanctions for conduct of this
type. The bankruptcy statute is designed to relieve a man
of his just debts, not from debts incurred by fraud,
embezzlement, misappropriation, defalcation, etc. by a
fiduciary or from debts incurred as a result of false pretenses or. wilful and malicious injuries to the property of
another. What the Respondents did with the Appellants'
property and funds which they were holding in trust
andjor wrongfully appropriated to their own use is
immaterial. It is clear that the acts done by Respondents
were done intentionally and with full knowledge of the
injury that would necessarily be sustained by Appellants
therefrom. No man should be permitted to take advantage
of his own deliberate wrongdoing.
The District Court's order of perpetual stay of execution should be vacated, and Appellants should be permitted to execute on their judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for Appellants
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

